ADMIRAL TURNER'S SPEECH OUTLINE

21 NOVEMBER 1973

THE MILITARY PROFESSION, by STANSFIELD TURNER

NAVY review(s) completed.

Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600050001-1

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THE MILITARY PROFESSION

Here you are at 11th seminar topic of 12. Marks shift from historical case studies toward more contemporary matters and thence into the Defense Economics and Decision making course. Thankful see so much after Thucyidides.

Like to talk first about why we have used history as the teaching vehicle.

Really - Amherst - Navy - frustration

Bismark, as you may recall, said, "Fools say they learn from experience. I prefer to profit from other people's experience." This is a practical approach to the use of historical experience. It doesn't go quite far enough for us. Much military knowledge simply cannot be learned from experience in advance of actual conflict. It's also dangerous in today's complex world to lean too heavily on our own particular experience. It is generally too narrow, and probably becoming more so as we continue to specialize. We simply must draw on the experience of others, many others. Studying history is one good way to do that.

At the same time, let's not forget that we can draw parallels and analogies between the past and the present only with peril. History never repeats itself exactly, because the same influencing conditions can never be exactly the same. If only the time has changed, the context in which people act has been altered, ergo the result will be different.

But some knowledge of history ought to be able to prevent some mistakes. Why were some decisions disastrous while others enormously successful? I look on strategy as a jig-saw puzzle that you are piecing together. But the pieces are not all in front of us. Many are hidden. In strategy you always have to look for the missing pieces. Your puzzle and mine may have more missing pieces than necessary, but that is because we haven't searched hard enough to find them. I would suggest also, that even an experienced historian-strategist like our Secretary of State has continually to search for the pieces of unsolved international puzzles.

The very process of dissecting and looking for significant pieces in the events of yesterday gives us insights into the forces influencing the world around us today. It develops the patience and inquisitive skepticism necessary to probe deeply in search of the truth. We hope that it is habit forming. We hope you will take from this course the desire to search for the truth; the wisdom that the truth is often not what it seems to be; and the recognition that perseverance and objectivity are the essential attributes in fathoming difficult problems.

Hopefully, you appreciate that strategic issues are far from black and white, right or wrong. And that the quest to understand the grays can be an exciting, worthwhile, intellectual challenge.

Is this the only rationale for studying history? An intellectual challenge for operationally oriented people like yourselves to adventure the wonderland of the liberal arts. No. Strategic concepts, including their historical derivation, are as much a part of your professional world as submarines, tanks, or missiles. It's part of the intellectual side of your career. From now on it will become more and more important to you as a decision-maker. Strategy is the framework within which decisions must be made. Your grasp of the intellectual principles that you have been studying and your ability to translate them into logical, workable, premises will directly influence the kind of officer you are, the kind of decisions that you make.

I should add that I am extremely pleased at the way you have tackled this first trimester's work. Your professors are excited by your enthusiasm and your willingness to accept each new challenge. Visiting lecturers have been extremely complimentary of your thoughtful seminar discussions and incisive questions.

A recent visitor wrote to me "I was impressed with the quality of the reading list, with the questions that were asked of me, with the discussions in the seminars I attended as well as with the content of most of the student papers I had an opportunity to read. I came away with a very strong feeling that staff and students were making every effort to achieve real

academic standards in the sense that I understand them." I can only believe you've begun to enjoy the intellectual jousting which goes with all this. It certainly clears away the cobwebs and gets the gears turning. It also confirms the confidence I have had in you. Your success has given me greater hope and expectation than I have had for some time in the kind of Armed Forces that can and will evolve in this country when you rise to the positions of leadership at the top.

History also ties to the idea that we are professionals - that there is a military profession.

Huntington: "historical perspective is part of the expertise which distinguishes a profession from a craft or skill. A plumber or carpenter does not need to know how and why his craft developed. He needs only to know the latest and best skills. Professional men must be aware of the tradition of which they are a part because it influences how they make decisions. It provides us with moral/ethical guides for actions.

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2. In a tactical sense this means understanding the constraints placed on tactical alternatives by tradition, by the national self-image, and by our military's sense of our reputation.

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Cambodian bombing, Watergate and Agnew.

We are all, politicians, bureaucrats, military men and others paying more attention to ethical issues today. Is this attention tending to make us regard ethical issues as black and white. Are they? Are ethics absolute? Are my ethics the same as yours? Are our professional ethics the same? Should they be? Can they be? Let's glance at 2 examples:

First, the Cambodian bombing records were falsification is bad? All bad? Should we consider that the reason for this falsification was to maintain a degree of military secrecy that has been accepted as normal in past wars?

Second, General Lavelle was certainly wrong to authorize the raids that he did but, did he do this on the basis of what he considered was the more moral alternative? Under the circumstances - an alternative that might have saved American lives?

In one of the books you are reading this week, the General, there were no starkly moral, black and white issues. The General simply went from combat action to combat action failing to reassess his assumptions. He goes from failure to failure with

greater and greater losses of personnel. Is this man venal? Stupid? Self-serving? Indifferent to human suffering? No. Forrester doesn't portray him that way. He makes him a basically bright, attractive, sincere and well-intentioned person. If the General failed to look for the truth, so too, did thousands of others in the military, civilian leadership, the press and the public of his time. The advice the General gave was telling people what they wanted to hear rather then committing occupational suicide as a renegade. He didn't see any moral or ethical issues to be surmounted. Or if he did washe perhaps saving himself until he would be in a position to be able to affect significant change? Or is there danger in what may happen to the values which any of us hold as we move along the way to such a position of responsibility? At what point do we decide something has to be said or done and to break with the system?

This raises an issue on which we all should cogitate. At what point do we make our disagreement with policy or operations known? Must we not avoid becoming committed in a small way such that we may later be unable to extract ourselves. But if we move precipitately to dissent - perhaps before all of the facts are clear - do we not run the danger of being a martyr for no cause at all?

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"Then Johnson had McNamara, just back from Vietnam, summarize the situation, growing Communist strength, steady government deterioration. Then Johnson took over. He had five choices. One was to blast the North off the map with bombers. Another was simply to pack up and go home. The third choice was to stay the way we were, perhaps lose more territory and suffer more casualties. The fourth was to go to the Congress for great sums of money, to call up the reserves and go on a wartime footing. The fifth choice was to expand the war without going on a wartime footing, to give the commanders what they needed. he had, he said, decided that this was the correct one, the centrist, moderate one: only Lyndon Johnson could go to war and be centrist and moderate. Then he turned to them and asked if anyone there had objections. He asked the principals one by one. The key moment was when he came to General Wheeler and stood looking directly at him for a moment. "Do you, General Wheeler, agree"? Wheeler nodded his agreement. It was, said someone who was present, an extraordinary moment, like watching a lion tamer

dealing with some of the great lions. Everyone in the room knew Wheeler objected, that the Chiefs wanted more, that they wanted a wartime footing and a call-up of the reserves; the thing they feared most was a partial war and a partial commitment. But Wheeler was boxed in; he had the choice of opposing and displeasing his Commander in Chief and being over-ruled, anyway, or going along. He went along. It was the beginning of what was to be a very difficult war for him, of being caught again and again between his civilian authorities and the other Chiefs (whose views he shared but was always able to contain himself). It was for him an endless series of frustrations, and only his brilliant political negotiations kept the Chiefs together and prevented several resignations at different points. He came out of it an exhausted and depleted man, his health ruined by major heart attacks, and the questions which he had faced at that July meeting still unanswered."

The break with authority or the system is especially difficult in our profession because other military organizations as employers are slim. The French Foreign Legion is no more and Russia, unlike her treatment of John Paul Jones, hasn't shown interest in our military iconoclasts recently.

It is not, though, just a matter of personal sacrifice of one's career that is involved. What are our obligations to our Service, to our comrades, to our country. Can these conflict with our personal sense of integrity? I would suggest that this issue is particularly vexing to a military man

because you and I must deal in two realms of morality -- the private and the public.

Now I don't suggest that this is entirely unique in the military. Every businessman, for instance, has his public responsibilities and morality. But I would suggest that there's a big difference between saying, "What's good for General Motors is good for the United States" and saying something like, "National security is essential to the preservation of our society."

The former is quoted almost always in derision, even though there's an element of truth in it. The latter has a great deal of truth in it. But, how many times is it quoted in support of questionable causes? That, it seems to me, is the essence of the issue of public morality for military men. That is, how often do you and I take advantage of the greater freedom that appeals to patriotism give us? After all, we work for the State. A fundamental proposition of any State is that it attempts to preserve itself, and hence the well-being of its citizens. As a result, we all commonly condone actions by our State that would contravene our private sense of morality. War itself is one example. Purpose ful deceit and spying are others.

Let's be more specific. Let me go back to the case of General Lavelle. Lavelle said he believed that he was acting in the spirit of his orders by preventing a Communist troop/material buildup. Why then did he falsify records? There was reason to be devious if he thought he was carrying out orders. Yet did he not really violate his trust by ordering 28 unauthorized raids and three falsified after-action reports?

Why did he do this? Was it for personal gain or glory? It doesn't appear that way to me. And, curiously, I have never seen a newspaper man suggest that. Nor have I ever seen one who even asked the question, Why did this man do what it is averred that he did? The newspapermen immediately assumed that because General Lavelle contravened our sense of private morality, he was deserving of condemnation. Perhaps in General Lavelle's view, he acted because his sense of public morality justified what he did. Perhaps he felt that the nation's interests were endangered by prolonging the war, and wasting lives, because of the way in which he was forced to fight.

Can we not in some sense sympathize with a man who at least appeared to be trying to serve his nation's security? And even perhaps, because he accepted the responsibility and the risk of disavowal and dishonor in order to achieve what seemed to him to be important to the country? But, too, are not loyalty and obedience the highest military virtues? Do we not, as professionals, abhor precedents that break down the fundamental precept of subordination in our military way of life! And at this particular moment in our country's history, wasn't General Lavelle running counter to what the citizens of this country would support as being in the interests of national security! Did he then, not hurt the image and reputation of our entire military profession, and in so doing, vitally damage our ability to defend the nation's security interests? And ironically,

did he not bring down upon us greater control of our military operations in war, the very thing that may have motivated him to break with authority?

Now let's look at the other and more recent case of military falsification - the Cambodian bombing fiasco. A good case can be made for the secrecy surrounding the over 3000 sorties made over Cambodia in 1969 and 70. But why was it necessary to lie about it. Here is what Tony Lewis who was at our Military-Media Conference last week, said about it:

"The bombing was done without announcement and without the approval of Congress. And now it emerges that even the classified military records were falsified. A former Air Force Officer testified that he and others had made detailed false reports of raids in South Vietnam - raids that were not made - and had burned the real records of attacks in Cambodia. A supposedly complete bombing record supplied to the Senate Armed Services Committee by the Pentagon only last month still omitted these Cambodia raids. General Brown, in a letter to the committee did not dispute the testimony. He just said in effect, that the lies did not matter because those who ordered and planned the raids would not have been deceived, He put it:

"I do not believe it is correct to characterize reports under special security precautions directed by higher authority as 'false' so long as the reports met in every detail the requirements imposed. They were not intended to deceive those with a security 'need-to-know'. . .

Translation of General Brown's Newspeak is easy. "Special security reporting" means lying. "Those who had a need to receive accurate information" means the chain of military command, presumably up to the President. Congress and the public had no "need to know" and hence were not entitled to the truth. Lies do not count when told to them. General Brown added that the false reports had not violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice. That requires proof of "intent to deceive," he said, and there was none here.

Is it the official policy of the Secretary of Defense that one legitimate security device shall be claculated falsifying of the military reporting system?

If so, it is quite clear that what the cadets in American military academies and the officers and men in the services are going to understand as the basis of their careers: Truth and your oath to the Constitution are outdated notions; you owe no respect to the American public or its legislative representatives; you may lie in the performance of your duties without fear of retribution or conscience, by relying on the "legal" excuse that your superiors knew you were lying.

Now I am not saying that Tony Lewis has an unbiased outlook on this. I am pointing out that we subject ourselves to unmerciful criticism and harm to our profession when we get into this kind of a position.

And how we get into some of these raises another issue you should think about. That is the case of the over zealous sergeant or lieutenant such as the ones who reported on the Cambodian and Lavelle cases. If there is a lack of accountability up and down the line, do we need a sergeant to blow the whistle? Is this a chain of command failure? How would you feel if a subordinate of yours pulled a tattle tale? After all, he's expected to know right from wrong, and as a matter of fact, has the <u>obligation</u> under the UCMJ of refusing to carry out illegal orders. Would you excorrate him for lack of loyalty to the organization? What if he is immature and overzealously wrong but does you and us grievous harm in the meantime? Does this not say something about the sense of confidence in the chain of command and the system, which we must engender if we are to survive?

Now I suppose that the key question that you and I should ask ourselves in thinking of the Lavelle and Cambodian cases is, "Did the people involved think these implications through before they took the actions they did?" Would you? Would I? Do you and I each carefully consider the possible conflicts of public and private morality before we act? Are we aware of the choices that we have to make--choices that are only blurred by stirring

slogans like, "What's good for General Motors . . ." or "National Security is essential . . ."

Can we lay down rules of conduct for situations like these, or other situations in which you and I may well find ourselves when loyalty, the prospects of promotion, public acclaim, and other factors, impinge on what our private conscience would tell us is right, moral or legal.

Obviously, there is no easy answer. In my personal view there is no rigid formula. What you want to dig out of this seminar week, however, is the nature of the conflicts of conscience and purpose that are likely to confront you as military men. Only by understanding that they exist, by seeing how others have handled them before you, and by dissecting the causative elements, can you possibly prepare yourselves to encounter situations such as these.

Be sure too, that you appreciate that I am not talking of issues that are confined only to four-star officers. These conflicts of public and private morality are with each of us from the day that we accept our commission. You simply can not live in an atmosphere where the glorious purpose of the organization permits some violations of private morality without it affecting your standards.

But there are obligations that we must keep in mind if we are to be professionals. Huntington says that the professional is a practicing expert, someone who works in a social context, who performs a service. The professional's client is always society. Society cannot function without him. This means that the professional must express a sense of social responsibility. If he does not, and if the services on which he has a monopoly are indeed essential to the society, that society is endangered.

Clearly, the basic sense of social responsibility in our profession is strong today. My Lai, Lavelle, the Cambodian cover up were individual failures to meet age-old standards of our profession. I am proud that no one has talked about "Post My Lai" morality - as some have of post-Watergate. We have the basic integrity to recognize and discredit an aberration.

Even so, there are some who believe that the unique elements of a military profession are bound to promote excesses of all sorts. They accuse us from time to time of being militaristic, rather than being military men. Alfred Vagts coined the word militarism, and he defined it in the following terms:

> "An Army so built that it serves military men, not war, is militaristic. So is everything in an army which is not preparation for fighting but merely exists for diversion or to satisfy peacetime whims, like the long anachronistic cavalry. This was well expressed by the Russian Grand Duke, who admitted that he hated war 'bacause it spoils the armies. . . .'"

Of course none of us here would think of becoming militaristic in Vagts' sense of the word. Surely none of us would go overboard for ceremonies or covet decorations, or be rigid in protocol or abuse the privileges of rank. None of us would be so anachronistic as to advocate cavalry or battleships long after their useful life had passed by. Certainly no one here would suggest that carriers or main battle tanks, or Continental Air Defense, or B-1's, or any of the many other projects that various of us have espoused in recent years, will ever appear to have been calalry cases.

Vagts wrote of militarism in 1937. He updated the book in 1959, but isn't this concept really out of date in the enlightened military environment in which you and I live? Isn't militarism an anachronism in itself? Well, I would suggest that in the very year that Vagts updated the book, the Army of France was exhibiting many of the characteristics of his definition. And I would suggest that today people still comment frequently on the "Military Mind" and the "Military Mentality." They accuse us of things like being innately conservative, failing to see when our place in the society has changed, being political whether we admit it or not, and suppressing innovations in tactics and even in technology, when it contravenes our accustomed way of doing things.

Or have we simply been the victim of type-casting? There are many ways, of course, in which we are type-cast. We--you and

I, should look at these roles, I believe, and try to see whether we think they are true, and if so, why? For instance, does our frequent necessity for subordinating individualism to obedience inevitably separate us from the liberal thinkers of the world? Or is it because our concern as a profession is with the use of military power and a liberal's concern is more with economics, that we appear to be separated? Or is that separation necessary and inevitable?

If we are isolated from our society, is it because of peculair requirements of our profession or our own indifference? Will the society help or aggravate this isolation as we move into an all-volunteer force? For instance if we do overstress the threat to national security, is it out of selfish purposes, or from a genuine concern that our politicians may not understand the proper exercise and limits of military force, and might get us into situations over our head.

Perhaps the type-casting that really bothers me most is the belief that we stubbonly resist change. One theory is that we are a small society unto ourselves; that any society has an instinct for self-preservation; and that preservation to most people means, "Don't change anything. Keep the status quo."

There are some choice stories in Elting Morison's delightful little book that unfortunately seem to bear out this thesis.

One of these involved one of my predecessors here as President of the War College, Admiral William S. Sims, and incidentally he happened to be the father-in-law of the author of the book. Professor Morison. At the turn of the century Captain Sims uncovered a way to make absolutely radical and marked improvements in naval gunnery. The Naval Society offered only unremitting resistance. Why? Because the people were either too stupid or too proud to see the improvements? No, not really. Because the people who resisted Sims indentified the Navy with a particular type of equipment or a particular set of procedures that were part of their own personal experience. To them, an attack on these particularities was, in effect, an attack on the whole Navy itself.

Can you imagine someone walking in the door this morning and standing up here and telling all of us that all ships are now outmoded, that there now are better ways to do the Navy's job? How do you think our little society would receive him? With openmindedness and joy?

Well Admiral Sims fortunately did succeed as you know. And as you've read, he appealed to outside authority--to the President himself. This led Admiral Mahan later to state that no Military Service could or should, undertake to reform itself. It simply had to be done from the outside.

Do you believe that? Do you want to admit that we can not shape our own destiny from within the military service?

And if we cannot, how in the world do we go about getting the help from the outside? In the business world, you can simply invite somebody in from the outside--even at the top! We've seldom brought in Admirals and Generals from the civilian world in our tight little society. But if Morison and Mahan are right, would you support selecting perhaps 30% of the Flag and General Officers each year from the civilian side of the world? Can you do that in what we call a profession? There are interesting concepts and conflicts here.

And look carefully in your reading this week at the other marvelous example of resistance to change, Morison's story of the USS WAMPANOAG, a ship which, incidentally, was named for an Indian tribe right from here in Southern New England. She was commissioned in 1868. She was steam propelled and could travel, at twenty knots. That was five knots faster than any other vessel afloat at that time. That is 33% speed advantage. She could run circles around anybody. Today we're paying millions of dollars for far lesser speed advantages. We didn't build another ship like WAMPANOAG for twenty years; and just one year after we commissioned her, we laid her up and eventually sold her.

Why did we do that? Well, Professor Morison suggest that it was because the Navy had no concept of why we needed such a ship. The Navy had no mission for a ship with her capabilities.

The reasons given at the time for eliminating her were in fact, specious. But perhaps the Naval Society was in fact, reacting with logic. For after all, if they didn't have the foresight to see where the WAMPANOAG fitted in, they were wasting resources to procure her.

Here now we see the transition that's coming between your Strategy Curriculum and your forthcoming Defense Economics Course. The Navy rejected WAMPANOAG because it did not have a clearly defined mission for the ship. Not until Mahan did the Navy gain an understanding of its objective, and go on to build ships of that type.

We'll work in your Defense Economics Curriculum to address the necessity for defining the purpose, the objectives of military forces--particularly of course, of Naval forces--before we can decide whether we should be building WAMPANOAGS, carriers, submarines, or what-have-you? For these past ten seminar weeks you've been dealing in the broad, ethereal realms of strategy. We're now beginning the deflation process to the everyday world of decision making. You will make better decisions if you can place them in a Strategic framework. You will also make better decisions if you appreciate the moral conflicts that you may face, the societal pressures of the military environment, and the dubious patterns that many of your predecessors have traced. All of these considerations form the background to your study in Defense Economics.

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because you and I must deal in two realms of morality - - the private and the public.

Now I don't suggest that this is entirely unique in the military. Every businessman, for instance, has his public responsibilities and morality. But I would suggest that there's a big difference between saying, "What's good for General Motors is good for the United States", and saying something like, "National security is essential to the preservation of our society."

The former is quoted almost always in derision, even though there's an element of truth in it. The latter has a great deal of truth in it. But, how many times is it quoted in support of questionable causes? That, it seems to me, is the essence of the issue of public morality for military men. That is, how often do you and I take advantage of the greater freedom that appeals to patriotism give us? After all, we work for the State. A fundamental proposition of any State is that it attempts to preserve itself, and hence the well-being of its citizens. As a result, we all commonly condone actions by our State that would contravene our private sense of morality. War itself is one example. Purposeful deceit and spying are others.

Let's be more specific. Let me go back to the case of General Lavelle. Lavelle said he believed that he was acting in the spirit of his orders by preventing a Communist troop/material buildup. Why then did he falsify records? There was reason to be devious if he thought he was carrying out orders. Yet did he not really violate his trust by ordering 28 unauthorized raids and three falsified after-action reports?

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Translation of General Brown's Newspeak is easy. "Special security reporting" means lying. "Those who had a need to receive accurate information" means the chain of military command, presumably up to the President. Congress and the public had no "need to know" and hence were not entitled to the truth. Lies do not count when told to them. General Brown added that the false reports had not violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice. That requires proof of "intent to deceive," he said, and there was none here.

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If so, it is quite clear that what the cadets in American military academies and the officers and men in the services are going to understand as the basis of their careers: Truth and your oath to the Constitution are outdated notions; you owe no respect to the American public or its legislative representatives; you may lie in the performance of your duties without fear of retribution or conscience, by relying on the "legal" excuse that your superiors knew you were lying.

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And how we get into some of these raises another issue ? you should think about. That is the case of the over zealous sergeant or lieutenant such as the ones who reported on the Cambodian and Lavelle cases. If there is a lack of accountability up and down the line, do we need a sergeant to blow the whistle? Is this a chain of command failure? How would you feel if a subordinate of yours pulled a tattle tale? After all, he's expected to know right from wrong, and as a matter of fact, has the obligation under the UCMJ of refusing to carry out illegal orders. Would you excorrate him for lack of loyalty to the organization? What if he is immature and overzealously wrong but does you and us grievous harm in the meantime. Does this not say something about the sense of confidence in the chain of command and the system, which we must engender if we are to survive?

Now I suppose that the key question that you and I should ask ourselves in thinking of the Lavelle and Cambodian cases is, "Did the people involved think these implications through before they took the actions they did?" Would you? Would I? Do you and I each carefully consider the possible conflicts of public and private morality before we act? Are we aware of the choices that we have to make--choices that are only blurred by stirring

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Can we lay down rules of conduct for situations like these, or other situations in which you and I may well find ourselves when loyalty, the prospects of promotion, public acclaim, and other factors, impinge on what our private conscience would tell us is right, moral or legal.

Obviously, there is no easy answer. In my personal view there is no rigid formula. What you want to dig out of this seminar week, however, is the nature of the conflicts of conscience and purpose that are likely to confront you as military men. Only by understanding that they exist, by seeing how others have handled them before you, and by dissecting the causative elements, can you possibly prepare yourselves to encounter situations such as these.

Be sure too, that you appreciate that I am not talking of issues that are confined only to four-star officers. These conflicts of public and private morality are with each of us from the day that we accept our commission. You simply can not live in an atmosphere where the glorious purpose of the organization permits some violations of private morality without it affecting your standards.

But there are obligations that we must keep in mind if we are to be professionals. Huntington says that the professional is a practicing expert, someone who works in a social context, who performs a service. The professional's client is always society. Society cannot function without him. This means that the professional must express a sense of social responsibility. If he does not, and if the services on which he has a monopoly are indeed essential to the society, that society is endangered.

Clearly, the basic sense of social responsibility in our profession is strong today. My Lai, Lavelle, the Cambodian cover up were individual failures to meet age-old standards of our profession. I am proud that no one has talked about "Post My Lai" morality - as some have of post-Watergate. We have the basic integrity to recognize and discredit an aberration. !!

Even so, there are some who believe that the unique elements of a military profession are bound to promote excesses of all sorts. They accuse us from time to time of being militaristic, rather than being military men. Alfred Vagts coined the word militarism, and he defined it in the following terms:

> "An Army so built that it serves military men, not war, is militaristic. So is everything in an army which is not preparation for fighting but merely exists for diversion or to satisfy peacetime whims, like the long anachronistic cavalry. This was well expressed by the Russian Grand Duke, who admitted that he hated war 'because it spoils the armies. . . .'"

Of course none of us here would think of becoming militaristic in Vagts' sense of the word. Surely none of us would go overboard for ceremonies or covet decorations, or be rigid in protocol or abuse the privileges of rank. None of us would be so anachronistic as to advocate cavalry or battleships long after their useful life had passed by. Certainly no one here would suggest that carriers or main battle tanks, or Continental Air Defense, or B-1's, or any of the many other projects that various of us have espoused in recent years, will ever appear to have been calalry cases.

Vagts wrote of militarism in 1937. He updated the book in 1959, but isn't this concept really out of date in the enlightened military environment in which you and I live? Isn't militarism an anachronism in itself? Well, I would suggest that in the very year that Vagts updated the book, the Army of France was exhibiting many of the characteristics of his definition. And I would suggest that today people still comment frequently on the "Military Mind" and the "Military Mentality." They accuse us of things like being innately conservative, failing to see when our place in the society has changed, being political whether we admit it or not, and suppressing innovations in tactics and even in technology, when it contravenes our accustomed way of doing things.

Or have we simply been the victim of type-casting? There are many ways, of course, in which we are type-cast. We--you and

I should look at these roles, I believe, and try to see whether we think they are true, and if so, why? For instance, does our frequent necessity for subordinating individualism to obedience inevitably separate us from the liberal thinkers of the world? Or is it because our concern as a profession is with the use of military power and a liberal's concern is more with economics, that we appear to be separated? Or is that separation necessary and inevitable?

If we are isolated from our society, is it because of peculair requirements of our profession or our own indifference? Will the society help or aggravate this isolation as we move into an all-volunteer force? For instance if we do overstress the threat to national security, is it out of selfish purposes, or from a genuine concern that our politicians may not understand the proper exercise and limits of military force, and might get us into situations over our head.

Perhaps the type-casting that really bothers me most is the belief that we stubbonly resist change. One theory is that we are a small society unto ourselves; that any society has an instinct for self-preservation; and that preservation to most people means, "Don't change anything. Keep the status quo."

There are some choice stories in Elting Morison's delightful little book that unfortunately seem to bear out this thesis.

One of these involved one of my predecessors here as President of the War College, Admiral William S. Sims, and incidentally he happened to be the father-in-law of the author of the book. Professor Morison. At the turn of the century Captain Sims uncovered a way to make absolutely radical and marked improvements in naval gunnery. The Naval Society offered only unremitting resistance. Why? Because the people were either too stupid or too proud to see the improvements? No, not really. Because the people who resisted Sims indentified the Navy with a particular type of equipment or a particular set of procedures that were part of their own personal experience. To them, an attack on these particularities was, in effect, an attack on the whole Navy itself.

Can you imagine someone walking in the door this morning and standing up here and telling all of us that all ships are now outmoded, that there now are better ways to do the Navy's job? How do you think our little society would receive him? With openmindedness and joy?

Well Admiral Sims fortunately did succeed as you know. And as you've read, he appealed to outside authority--to the President himself. This led Admiral Mahan later to state that no Military Service could or should, undertake to reform itself. It simply had to be done from the outside.

Do you believe that? Do you want to admit that we can not shape our own destiny from within the military service?

And if we cannot, how in the world do we go about getting the help from the outside? In the business world, you can simply invite somebody in from the outside--even at the top! We've seldom brought in Admirals and Generals from the civilian world in our tight little society. But if Morison and Mahan are right, would you support selecting perhaps 30% of the Flag and General Officers each year from the civilian side of the world? Can you do that in what we call a profession? There are interesting concepts and conflicts here.

And look carefully in your reading this week at the other marvelous example of resistance to change, Morison's story of the USS WAMPANOAG, a ship which, incidentally, was named for an Indian tribe right from here in Southern New England. She was commissioned in 1868. She was steam propelled and could travel, at twenty knots. That was five knots faster than any other vessel afloat at that time. That is 33% speed advantage. She could run circles around anybody. Today we're paying millions of dollars for far lesser speed advantages. We didn't build another ship like WAMPANOAG for twenty years; and just one year after we commissioned her, we laid her up and eventually sold her.

Why did we do that? Well, Professor Morison suggest that it was because the Navy had no concept of why we needed such a ship. The Navy had no mission for a ship with her capabilities.

The reasons given at the time for eliminating her were in fact, specious. But perhaps the Naval Society was in fact, reacting with logic. For after all, if they didn't have the foresight to see where the WAMPANOAG fitted in, they were wasting resources to procure her.

Here now we see the transition that's coming between your Strategy Curriculum and your forthcoming Defense Economics Course. The Navy rejected WAMPANOAG because it did not have a clearly defined mission for the ship. Not until Mahan did the Navy gain an understanding of its objective, and go on to build ships of that type. "

We'll work in your Defense Economics Curriculum to address the necessity for defining the purpose, the objectives of military forces--particularly of course, of Naval forces--before we can decide whether we should be building WAMPANOAGS, carriers, submarines, or what-have-you? For these past ten seminar weeks you've been dealing in the broad, ethereal realms of strategy. We're now beginning the deflation process to the everyday world of decision making. You will make better decisions if you can place them in a strategic framework. You will also make better decisions if you appreciate the moral conflicts that you may face, the societal pressures of the military environment, and the dubious patterns that many of your predecessors have traced. All of these considerations form the background to your study in Defense Economics.

11/21/73

THE MILITARY PROFESSION

Here you are at 11th seminar topic of 12. Marks shift from historical case studies toward more contemporary matters and thence into the Defense Economics and Decision making course. Thankful see so much after Thucyidides.

Like to talk first about why we have used history as the teaching vehicle.

Really - Amherst - Navy - frustration

Bismark, as you may recall, said, "Fools say they learn from experience. I prefer to profit from other people's experience." This is a practical approach to the use of historical experience. It doesn't go quite far enough for us. Much military knowledge simply cannot be learned from experience in advance of actual conflict. It's also dangerous in today's complex world to lean too heavily on our own particular experience. It is generally too narrow, and probably becoming more so as we continue to specialize. We simply must draw on the experience of others, many others. Studying history is one good way to do that.

At the same time, let's not forget that we can draw parallels and analogies between the past and the present only with peril History never repeats itself exactly, because the same influencing conditions can never be exactly the same. If only the time has changed, the context in which people act has been altered, ergo the result will be different.

But some knowledge of history ought to be able to prevent some mistakes. Why were some decisions disastrous while others enormously successful? I look on strategy as a jig-saw puzzle that you are piecing together. But the pieces are not all in front of us. Many are hidden. In strategy you always have to look for the missing pieces. Your puzzle and mine may have more missing pieces than necessary, but that is because we haven't searched hard enough to find them. I would suggest also, that even an experienced historian-strategist like our Secretary of State has continually to search for the pieces of unsolved international puzzles.

The very process of dissecting and looking for significant pieces in the events of yesterday gives us insights into the forces influencing the world around us today. It develops the patience and inquisitive skepticism necessary to probe deeply in search of the truth. We hope that it is habit forming. We hope you will take from this course the desire to search for the truth; the wisdom that the truth is often not what it seems to be; and the recognition that perseverance and objectivity are the essential attributes in fathoming difficult problems.

Hopefully, you appreciate that strategic issues are far from black and white, right or wrong. And that the quest to understand the grays can be an exciting, worthwhile, intellectual challenge.

Is this the only rationale for studying history? An intellectual challenge for operationally oriented people like yourselves to adventure the wonderland of the liberal arts. No. Strategic concepts, including their historical derivation, are as much a part of your professional world as submarines, tanks, or missiles. It's part of the intellectual side of your career. From now on it will become more and more important to you as a decision-maker. Strategy is the framework within which decisions must be made. Your grasp of the intellectual principles that you have been studying and your ability to translate them into logical, workable, premises will directly influence the kind of officer you are, the kind of decisions that you make.

I should add that I am extremely pleased at the way you have tackled this first trimester's work. Your professors are excited by your enthusiasm and your willingness to accept each new challenge. Visiting lecturers have been extremely complimentary of your thoughtful seminar discussions and incisive questions.

A recent visitor wrote to me "I was impressed with the quality of the reading list, with the questions that were asked of me, with the discussions in the seminars I attended as well as with the content of most of the student papers I had an opportunity to read. I came away with a very strong feeling that staff and students were making every effort to achieve real

academic standards in the sense that I understand them."
I can only believe you've begun to enjoy the intellectual jousting which goes with all this. It certainly clears away the cobwebs and gets the gears turning. It also confirms the confidence I have had in you. Your success has given me greater hope and expectation than I have had for some time in the kind of Armed Forces that can and will evolve in this country when you rise to the positions of leadership at the top.

History also ties to the idea that we are professionals - that there is a military profession.

Huntington: historical perspective is part of the expertise which distinguishes a profession from a craft or skill. A plumber or carpenter does not need to know how and why his craft developed. He needs only to know the latest and best skills. Professional men must be aware of the tradition of which they are a part because it influences how they make decisions. It provides us with moral/ethical guides for actions.

1. In an economic sense this means understanding to what extent the state can and will support certain alternatives.
2. In a tactical sense this means understanding the constraints placed on tactical alternatives by tradition, by the national self-image, and by our military's sense of our reputation.

There are 2 characteristics or aspects of our profession which I want to stress -

One is our Ethics; and the other our Ability to adapt to change

Ethics was a good topic last year with my Lai and

Lavelle as fresh examples

It is even more cogent this year - added

Cambodian bombing, Watergate and Agnew.

We are all, politicians, bureaucrats, military men and others paying more attention to ethical issues today. Is this attention tending to make us regard ethical issues as black and white. Are they? Are ethics absolute? Are my ethics the same as yours? Are our professional ethics the same? Should they be? Can they be? Let's glance at 2 examples:

First, the Cambodian bombing records were falsification is bad? All bad? Should we consider that the reason for this falsification was to maintain a degree of military secrecy that has been accepted as normal in past wars?

Second, General Lavelle was certainly wrong to authorize the raids that he did but, did he do this on the basis of what he considered was the more moral alternative? Under the circumstances - an alternative that might have saved American lives?

In one of the books you are reading this week, the General, there were no starkly moral, black and white issues. The General simply went from combat action to combat action failing to reassess his assumptions. He goes from failure to failure with

greater and greater losses of personnel. Is this man venal? Stupid? Self-serving? Indifferent to human suffering? No. Forrester doesn't portray him that way. He makes him a basically bright, attractive, sincere and well-intentioned person. If the General failed to look for the truth, so too, did thousands of others in the military, civilian leadership, the press and the public of his time. The advice the General gave was telling people what they wanted to hear rather then committing occupational suicide as a renegade. He didn't see any moral or ethical issues to be surmounted. Or if he did washe perhaps saving himself until he would be in a position to be able to affect significant change? Or is there danger in what may happen to the values which any of us hold as we move along the way to such a position of responsibility? At what point do we decide something has to be said or done and to break with the system?

This raises an issue on which we all should cogitate. At what point do we make our disagreement with policy or operations known? Must we not avoid becoming committed in a small way such that we may later be unable to extract ourselves. But if we move precipitately to dissent - perhaps before all of the facts are clear - do we not run the danger of being a martyr for no cause at all?

Poignant - Halberstam

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Can we lay down rules of conduct for situations like these, or other situations in which you and I may well find ourselves when loyalty, the prospects of promotion, public acclaim, and other factors, impinge on what our private conscience would tell us is right, moral or legal.

Obviously, there is no easy answer. In my personal view there is no rigid formula. What you want to dig out of this seminar week, however, is the nature of the conflicts of conscience and purpose that are likely to confront you as military men. Only by understanding that they exist, by seeing how others have handled them before you, and by dissecting the causative elements, can you possibly prepare yourselves to encounter situations such as these.

Be sure too, that you appreciate that I am not talking of issues that are confined only to four-star officers. These conflicts of public and private morality are with each of us from the day that we accept our commission. You simply can not live in an atmosphere where the glorious purpose of the organization permits some violations of private morality without it affecting your standards.

But there are obligations that we must keep in mind if we are to be professionals. Huntington says that the professional is a practicing expert, someone who works in a social context, who performs a service. The professional's client is always society. Society cannot function without him. This means that the professional must express a sense of social responsibility. If he does not, and if the services on which he has a monopoly are indeed essential to the society, that society is endangered.

Clearly, the basic sense of social responsibility in our profession is strong today. My Lai, Lavelle, the Cambodian cover up were individual failures to meet age-old standards of our profession. I am proud that no one has talked about "Post My Lai" morality - as some have of post-Watergate. We have the basic integrity to recognize and discredit an aberration.

Even so, there are some who believe that the unique elements of a military profession are bound to promote excesses of all sorts. They accuse us from time to time of being militaristic, rather than being military men. Alfred Vagts coined the word militarism, and he defined it in the following terms:

> "An Army so built that it serves military men, not war, is militaristic. So is everything in an army which is not preparation for fighting but merely exists for diversion or to satisfy peacetime whims, like the long anachronistic cavalry. This was well expressed by the Russian Grand Duke, who admitted that he hated war 'bacause it spoils the armies. . .'"

Of course none of us here would think of becoming militaristic in Vagts' sense of the word. Surely none of us would go overboard for ceremonies or covet decorations, or be rigid in protocol or abuse the privileges of rank. None of us would be so anachronistic as to advocate cavalry or battleships long after their useful life had passed by. Certainly no one here would suggest that carriers or main battle tanks, or Continental Air Defense, or B-1's, or any of the many other projects that various of us have espoused in recent years, will ever appear to have been calalry cases.

Vagts wrote of militarism in 1937. He updated the book in 1959, but isn't this concept really out of date in the enlightened military environment in which you and I live? Isn't militarism an anachronism in itself? Well, I would suggest that in the very year that Vagts updated the book, the Army of France was exhibiting many of the characteristics of his definition. And I would suggest that today people still comment frequently on the "Military Mind" and the "Military Mentality." They accuse us of things like being innately conservative, failing to see when our place in the society has changed, being political whether we admit it or not, and suppressing innovations in tactics and even in technology, when it contravenes our accustomed way of doing things.

Or have we simply been the victim of type-casting? There are many ways, of course, in which we are type-cast. We--you and

I, should look at these roles, I believe, and try to see whether we think they are true, and if so, why? For instance, does our frequent necessity for subordinating individualism to obedience inevitably separate us from the liberal thinkers of the world? Or is it because our concern as a profession is with the use of military power and a liberal's concern is more with economics, that we appear to be separated? Or is that separation necessary and inevitable?

If we are isolated from our society, is it because of peculair requirements of our profession or our own indifference? Will the society help or aggravate this isolation as we move into an all-volunteer force? For instance if we do overstress the threat to national security, is it out of selfish purposes, or from a genuine concern that our politicians may not understand the proper exercise and limits of military force, and might get us into situations over our head.

Perhaps the type-casting that really bothers me most is the belief that we stubbonly resist change. One theory is that we are a small society unto ourselves; that any society has an instinct for self-preservation; and that preservation to most people means, "Don't change anything. Keep the status quo."

There are some choice stories in Elting Morison's delightful little book that unfortunately seem to bear out this thesis.

One of these involved one of my predecessors here as President of the War College, Admiral William S. Sims, and incidentally he happened to be the father-in-law of the author of the book. Professor Morison. At the turn of the century Captain Sims uncovered a way to make absolutely radical and marked improvements in naval gunnery. The Naval Society offered only unremitting resistance. Why? Because the people were either too stupid or too proud to see the improvements? No, not really. Because the people who resisted Sims indentified the Navy with a particular type of equipment or a particular set of procedures that were part of their own personal experience. To them, an attack on these particularities was, in effect, an attack on the whole Navy itself.

Can you imagine someone walking in the door this morning and standing up here and telling all of us that all ships are now outmoded, that there now are better ways to do the Navy's job? How do you think our little society would receive him? With openmindedness and joy?

Well Admiral Sims fortunately did succeed as you know. And as you've read, he appealed to outside authority--to the President himself. This led Admiral Mahan later to state that no Military Service could or should, undertake to reform itself. It simply had to be done from the outside.

Do you believe that? Do you want to admit that we can not shape our own destiny from within the military service?

And if we cannot, how in the world do we go about getting the help from the outside? In the business world, you can simply invite somebody in from the outside--even at the top! We've seldom brought in Admirals and Generals from the civilian world in our tight little society. But if Morison and Mahan are right, would you support selecting perhaps 30% of the Flag and General Officers each year from the civilian side of the world? Can you do that in what we call a profession? There are interesting concepts and conflicts here.

And look carefully in your reading this week at the other marvelous example of resistance to change, Morison's story of the USS WAMPANOAG, a ship which, incidentally, was named for an Indian tribe right from here in Southern New England. She was commissioned in 1868. She was steam propelled and could travel, at twenty knots. That was five knots faster than any other vessel afloat at that time. That is 33% speed advantage. She could run circles around anybody. Today we're paying millions of dollars for far lesser speed advantages. We didn't build another ship like WAMPANOAG for twenty years; and just one year after we commissioned her, we laid her up and eventually sold her.

Why did we do that? Well, Professor Morison suggest that it was because the Navy had no concept of why we needed such a ship. The Navy had no mission for a ship with her capabilities.

The reasons given at the time for eliminating her were in fact, specious. But perhaps the Naval Society was in fact, reacting with logic. For after all, if they didn't have the foresight to see where the WAMPANOAG fitted in, they were wasting resources to procure her.

Here now we see the transition that's coming between your Strategy Curriculum and your forthcoming Defense Economics Course. The Navy rejected WAMPANOAG because it did not have a clearly defined mission for the ship. Not until Mahan did the Navy gain an understanding of its objective, and go on to build ships of that type.

We'll work in your Defense Economics Curriculum to address the necessity for defining the purpose, the objectives of military forces--particularly of course, of Naval forces--before we can decide whether we should be building WAMPANOAGS, carriers, submarines, or what-have-you? For these past ten seminar weeks you've been dealing in the broad, ethereal realms of strategy. We're now beginning the deflation process to the everyday world of decision making. You will make better decisions if you can place them in a Strategic framework. You will also make better decisions if you appreciate the moral conflicts that you may face, the societal pressures of the military environment, and the dubious patterns that many of your predecessors have traced. All of these considerations form the background to your study in Defense Economics.

THE MILITARY PROFESSION

Marks shift from historical case studies toward more contemporary matters and hence into the Defense Economics and Decision making course.

Like to talk first about why we have used history as the teaching vehicle.

Really - Amherst - Navy - frustration

Bismark, as you may recall, said, "Fools say they learn from experience. I prefer to profit from other people's experience." This is a practical approach to the use of historical experience, but, I'm sure you appreciate it's a limited one as stated. It doesn't go quite far enough. Much military knowledge simply cannot be learned by vicarious experience in advance of actual conflict. It's also dangerous to lean too heavily on our own or another individual's experience. This is generally too narrow, and probably becoming more so as we continue to specialize. We simply must draw on the experience of others, many others. Studying history is one good way to do that.

At the same time, let's not "forget" that can draw parallels and analogies between the past and the present only with peril History never repeats itself exactly, because the same influencing conditions can never be exactly the same. If only the time has changed, the context in which people act has been altered, ergo the result will be different.

But some knowledge of history ought to be able to prevent some mistakes. Why were some decisions disastrous while others enormously successful? I look on strategy as a jig-saw puzzle that you are piecing together. But the pieces are not all in front of us. Many are hidden. In strategy you always have to look for the missing pieces. Your puzzle and mine may have more missing pieces than necessary, but that's because we haven't looked hard enough to find them. I would suggest also, that even an experienced historian-strategist like our Secretary of State has to continually search for the pieces of unsolved international puzzles.

The very process of dissecting and looking for significant pieces in the events of yesterday gives us insights into the forces influencing the world around us today. It develops the patience and inquisitive skepticism necessary to probe deeply in search of the truth. We hope it's habit forming. We hope you will take from this course the desire to search for the truth; the wisdom that the truth is often not what it seems to be; and the recognition that perseverance and objectivity are sine qua non Attributes in fathoming difficult problems.

Hopefully, you appreciate that strategic issues are far from black and white, right or wrong. And that the quest to understand the grays can be an exciting, worthwhile, intellectual challenge.

Is this the only rationale for studying history? An intellectual challenge? An adventure for the operator into the "Wonderful land" of liberal arts? Have you engineers and scientists felt a bit like a duck out of water? If so, I hope time will change that attitude. Strategic concepts, including their historical derivation, are as much a part of your professional world as submarines, tanks, or missiles. It's part of the intellectual side of your career. From now on it will become more and more important to you as a decision-maker. Strategy is the framework within which decisions must be made. Your grasp of the intellectual principles you've been studying and your ability to conceptually translate them into logical, workable, premises will directly influence the kind of officer you are, the kind of decisions you make.

If all this sounds discouraging to you, I should add that I am extremely pleased at the way you have tackled this first trimester's work. Your professors are excited by your enthusiasm and willingness to accept each new challenge. Visiting lecturers have been extremely complimentary of your thoughtful seminar discussions and incisive questions.

A recent visitor said "I was impressed with the quality of the reading list, with the questions that were asked of me, with the discussions in seminars I attended as well as with the content of most of the student papers I had an opportunity to read. I came away with a very strong feeling that staff and students were making every effort to achieve real academic standards

in the sense that I understand them." (Robert D. Challener). I can only believe you've begun to enjoy the intellectual jousting which goes with all this. It certainly clears away the cobwebs and gets the gears turning. It also confirms the confidence I have had in you. Your success has given me greater hope and expectation than I have had for some time in the kind of Armed Forces that can and will evolve in this country when you rise to the positions of leadership at the top.

History also ties to idea we are professionals - have a military profession.

Huntington: "historical perspective is part of the expertise which distinguishes a profession from a craft or skill. Plumber or carpenter does not need to know how and why his craft developed. He needs to know the latest and best skills. Professional must be aware of the tradition of which he is a part because it influences how he makes decisions. It provides him moral/ethical guides for actions.

1. Economic sense: by understanding to what extent the state can/will support certain alternatives
2. Tactical sense: by understanding the tactical constraints placed on alternatives by tradition, the national self-image, the military's sense of reputation.

2 Characteristics of profession want to stress -

Ethics and Ability to adapt

Ethics a good topic last year with my Lai and Lavelle as examples

Even more cogent this year -

Cambodian bombing

Watergate

Agnew

We are certainly paying more attention to ethical issues. Is this attention tending to make us regard ethical issues as black and white. Ar they? Are ethics absolute? Are my ethics the same as yours? Are our professional ethics the same? Should they be? Can they be?

1. Cambodian bombing records falsified. Falsification is bad? All bad? Should we consider that the only reason for falsification was to maintain a degree of military secrecy that has been normal in past wars?
2. Lavelle - He was certainly wrong to authorize the raids. But, did he do this on the basis of what he considered was the more moral alternative? Under the circumstances - an alternative that might have saved American lives? In one of the books you are reading, The General, there were no starkly moral, black and white questions. The General simply went from combat action to combat action failing to reassess his assumptions. He goes from failure to failure with

greater and greater losses of personnel. Is this man venal? Stupid? Self-serving? Indifferent to human suffering? No. Forrester doesn't portray him that way. He makes him a basically bright, attractive, sincere and well-intentioned person. If the General failed to look for the truth, so too, did thousands of others in the military, civilian leadership, the press and the public. The advice the General gave was telling people what they wanted to hear vs. committing occupational suicide as a renegade. Was he unethical? Culpable?

Is it perhaps better to save yourself until you are in a position where you can really affect change? Or is there danger in what may happen to your values along the way? At what point do you decide something has to be said/done and you break with the system? To what extent/how long can you compromise your values/ethics? At what point do you/can you stop?

Issue of personal gain, position, prestige vs. breaking with accepted norms of the profession

This raises an issue on which we all should cogitate. At what point do we make our disagreement with policy or operations known? How do we avoid becoming committed in a small way but unable to extract ourselves. But if we move precipitately to dissent - perhaps before all of the facts are clear - do we not run the danger of being a martyr for no cause at all?

Poignant - Halberstam

"There Johnson had McNamara, just back from Vietnam, summarize the situation, growing Communist strength, steady government deterioration. Then Johnson took over. He had five choices. One was to blast the North off the map with bombers. Another was simply to pack up and go home. The third choice was to stay the way we were, perhaps lose more territory and suffer more casualties. The fourth was to go to the Congress for great sums of money, to call up the reserves and go on a wartime footing. The fifth choice was to expand the war without going on a wartime footing, to give the commanders what they needed. he had, he said, decided that this was the correct one, the centrist, moderate one: only Lyndon Johnson could go to war and be centrist and moderate. Then he turned to them and asked if anyone there had objections. He asked the principals one by one. The key moment was when he came to General Wheeler and stood looking directly at him for a moment. "Do you, General Wheeler, agree"? Wheeler nodded his agreement. It was, said someone who was present, an extraordinary moment, like watching a lion tamer

dealing with some of the great lions. Everyone in the room knew Wheeler objected, that the Chiefs wanted more, that they wanted a wartime footing and a call-up of the reserves; the thing they feared most was a partial war and a partial commitment. But Wheeler was boxed in; he had the choice of opposing and displeasing his Commander in Chief and being over-ruled, anyway, or going along. He went along. It was the beginning of what was to be a very difficult war for him, of being caught again and again between his civilian authorities and the other Chiefs (whose views he shared but was always able to contain himself). It was for him an endless series of frustrations, and only his brilliant political negotiations kept the Chiefs together and prevented several resignations at different points. He came out of it an exhausted and depleted man, his health ruined by major heart attacks, and the questions which he had faced at that July meeting still unanswered."

The break with authority or the system is especially difficult in our profession because other employers (military organizations) are slim. The French Foreign Legion is no more and Russia, unlike her treatment of John Paul Jones, hasn't shown interest in our military iconoclasts recently.

It is not, though, just a matter of personal sacrifice of one's career that is involved. What are our obligations to our Service, to our comrades, to our country. Can these conflict with our personal sense of integrity? I would suggest that this issue is particularly vexing to a military man

because you and I must deal in two realms of morality - - the private and the public.

Now I don't suggest that this is unique in the military. Every businessman, for instance, has his public responsibilities and morality. But I would suggest that there's a big difference between saying, "What's good for General Motors is good for the United States", and saying something like, "National security is essential to the preservation of our society."

The former is quoted almost always in derision, even though there's an element of truth in it. The latter has a great deal of truth in it. But, how many times is it quoted in support of questionable causes? That, it seems to me, is the essence of the issue of public morality for military men. That is, how often do you and I take advantage of the greater fredom that appeals to patriotism give us? After all, we work for the State. A fundamental proposition of any State is that it attempts to preserve itself, and hence the well-being of its citizens. As a result, we all commonly condone actions by our State that would contravene our private sense of morality. War itself is one example. Purpose ful deceit and spying are others.

Let's be more specific. Let me take the case of General Lavelle. Lavelle said he believed he was acting in the spirit of his orders by preventing a Communist troop/material buildup. Why then did he falsify records? No reason to be devious if true. Yet did he not violate his trust by ordering 28 unauthorized raids and three falsified after-action reports?

Why did he do this? Was it for personal gain or glory? It doesn't appear that way to me. And, curiously, I have never seen a newspaper man suggest that. Nor have I ever seen one who even asked the question, Why did this man do what it is averred that he did? The newspapermen immediately assumed that because General Lavelle contravened our sense of private morality, he was deserving of condemnation. Perhaps in General Lavelle's view, he acted because his sense of public morality justified what he did. Perhaps he felt that the nation's interests were endangered by prolonging the war, and wasting lives, because of the way in which he was pushed to fight.

Can we not in some sense sympathize with a man who at least appeared to be trying to serve his nation's security? And even perhaps, because he accepted the responsibility and risk of disavowal and dishonor in order to achieve what seemed to him to be important to the country? But, too, are not loyalty and obedience the highest military virtues? Do we not, as professionals, abhor precedents that break down the fundamental precept of subordination in our military way of life! And at this particular moment in our country's history, wasn't General Lavelle running counter to what the citizens of this country would support as being in the interests of national security! Did he then, not hurt the image and reputation of our entire military profession, and in so doing, vitally damage our ability to defend the nation's security interests? And ironically,

did he not bring down greater control of our military operations in war, the very thing that may have motivated him in the first place to break with authority?

Now let's look at the other and more recent case of military falsification - the Cambodian bombing fiasco. A good case can be made for the secrecy surrounding the over 3000 sorties made over Cambodia in 1969 and 70. But why was it necessary to lie about it. Here's what Tony Lewis (Military-Media Conference last week) said about it-

No Intent to Deceive

By Anthony Lewis

LONDON, July 22—When is a lie not a lie? When it deceives only 99.9 per cent of those who hear it.

That is the moral doctrine of Gen. George S. Brown, the new Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force. He propounded it the other day in commenting on the disclosure that Air Force officers had systematically falsified reports in order to conceal the secret American bombing of Cambodia.

By all indications General Brown was serious. He probably reflects the legal and moral attitudes of a number of military leaders. It would therefore be a mistake to let his statement pass without close attention.

Between March, 1969, and April, 1970, the Air Force made 3,630 bombing sorties on Cambodia, a country whose neutrality the United States officially respected. The bombing was done without announcement and without the approval of Congress. And now it emerges that even the classified military records were falsified.

A former Air Force officer testified that he and others had made detailed false reports of raids in South Vietnam—raids that were not made—and had burned the real records of attacks in Cambodia. A supposedly complete bombing record supplied to the Senate Armed Services Committee by the Pentagon only last month still omitted these Cambodia raids.

General Brown, in a letter to the committee, did not dispute the testimony. He just said, in effect, that the lies did not matter because those who ordered and planned the raids would not have been deceived. He put it:

"I do not believe it is correct to characterize reports under special security precautions directed by higher authority as 'false' so long as the reports met in every detail the requirements imposed. They were not intended to deceive those with a security 'need-to-know.'

"I feel sure that the special security reporting conducted at unit level was designed to provide for maximum security, not to mislead those who had a need to receive accurate information."

Translation of General Brown's Newspeak is easy. "Special security reporting" means lying. "Those who had a need to receive accurate information" means the military command, presumably up to the President. Congress and the public had no "need to know" and hence were not entitled to the truth. Lies do not count when told to them.

AT HOME ABROAD

General Brown added that the false reports had not violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice. That requires proof of "intent to deceive," he said, and there was none here.

These theories got no support from Melvin R. Laird, the former Secretary of Defense now in the White House, or Henry Kissinger, who termed the falsification of records "deplorable." But the present Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, described the practice in officialese as a species of "special security precautions." And his spokesman defended it as mere double-entry bookkeeping.

Is General Brown's moral and constitutional doctrine what they teach at the Air Force Academy? Is it the official policy of the Secretary of Defense that one legitimate security device shall be calculated falsifying of the military reporting system?

■

If so, it is quite clear what the cadets in American military academies and the officers and men in the services are going to understand as the basis of their careers: Truth and your oath to the Constitution are outdated notions; you owe no respect to the American public or its legislative representatives; you may lie in the performance of your duties without fear of retribution or conscience, by relying on the "legal" excuse that your superiors knew you were lying.

What is so sad is that the Pentagon reaction to the Cambodian bombing disclosures was all so unnecessary. Just a little candor and sense of proportion would have enabled a Chief of Staff or a Secretary of Defense to say something like this:

"The testimony about falsifying of bombing records is correct. These measures were undertaken in 1969-70 in good faith, in connection with highly sensitive military missions. But it is recognized now that falsification of the military records system is not an appropriate security measure. The department also regrets the supplying of inaccurate information to Congress."

Why is it that we do not get such simple — and effective — admissions of error? Doubtless the most important reason is that we look to the President of the United States for [illegible] President now who sets an example of defensiveness, obsession with secrecy and indifference to law.

Now I am not saying that Tony Lewis has an unbrased outlook on this. I am pointing out that we subject ourselves to unmerciful criticism and harm to our profession when we get into this kind of a position.

And how we get into some of these raises another issue you should think aobut. That is the case of the over zealous sergeant or lieutenant such as the ones who reported on the Cambodian and Lavelle cases. If there is a lack of accountability up and donw the line, do we need a sergeant to blow the whistle? Is this a chain of command failure? How would you feel if a subordinate of yours pulled a tattle tale? After all, he's expected to know right from wrong, and as a matter of fact, has the obligation under the UCMJ of refusing to carry out illegal orders. Would you excorrate him for lack of loyalty to the organization? What if he is immature and over-zealously wrong but does you and us grievous harm in the meantime. Does this not say something of the sense of confidence in the chain of command in the system which we must engender if we are to survive?

Now I suppose that the key question that you and I should ask ourselves in thinking of the Lavelle and Cambodian cases is, Did the people involved think these implications through before they took the actions they did? Would you? Would I? Do you and I each carefully consider the possible conflicts of public and private morality before we act? Are we aware of the choices that we have to make--choices that are only blurred by stirring

slogans like, "What's good for General Motors . . ." or "National Security is essential . . ."

Can we lay down rules of conduct for situations like these, or other situations in which you and I may well find ourselves when loyalty, the prospects of promotion, public acclaim, and other factors, impinge on what our private conscience would tell us is right, moral or legal.

Obviously, there is no easy answer. In my personal view there is no rigid formula. What you want to dig out of this Seminar Week, however, is the nature of the conflicts of conscience and purpose that are likely to confront you as military men. Only by understanding that they exist, by seeing how others have handled them before you, and by dissecting the causative elements, can you possibly prepare yourselves to encounter situations such as these.

Be sure too, that you appreciate that I am not talking of issues that are confined only to four-star officers. These conflicts of public and private morality are with each of us from the day we accept our commission. You simply can not live in an atmosphere where the glorious purpose of the organization permits some violations of private morality without it affecting your standards.

11/21/73

THE MILITARY PROFESSION

Here you are at 11th seminar topic of 12. Marks shift from historical case studies toward more contemporary matters and thence into the Defense Economics and Decision making course. Thankful see so much after Thucyidides. Last year

Like to talk first about why we have used history as the teaching vehicle.

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Bismark, as you may recall, said, "Fools say they learn from experience. I prefer to profit from other people's experience." This is a practical approach to the use of historical experience. It doesn't go quite far enough for us. Much military knowledge simply cannot be learned from experience in advance of actual conflict. The best you can do is to look at the analogous experiences of others. It's also dangerous in today's complex world to lean too heavily on our own particular experiences. They are generally too narrow, and are probably becoming more so as we continue to specialize. We simply must draw on the experience of others, many others. Studying history is one good way to do that.

At the same time, let's not forget that we can draw parallels and analogies between the past and the present only with peril. History never repeats itself exactly, because the same influencing conditions can never be exactly the same. If only the time has changed, the context in which people act has been altered, ergo the result will be different.

But some knowledge of history ought to be able to prevent some mistakes. Why were some decisions disastrous while others enormously successful? I look on strategy as a jig-saw puzzle that you are piecing together. But the pieces are not all in front of us. Many are hidden. In strategy you always have to look for the missing pieces. Your puzzle and mine may have more missing pieces than necessary, but that is because we haven't searched hard enough to find them. I would suggest also, that even an experienced historian-strategist like our Secretary of State has continually to search for the pieces of unsolved international puzzles.

The very process of dissecting and looking for significant pieces in the events of yesterday gives us insights into the forces influencing the world around us today. It develops the patience and inquisitive skepticism necessary to probe deeply in search of the truth. We hope that it is habit forming. We hope you will take from this course the desire to search for the truth; the wisdom that the truth is often not what it seems to be; and the recognition that perseverance and objectivity are the essential attributes in fathoming difficult problems.

Hopefully, you appreciate that strategic issues are far from black and white, right or wrong. And that the quest to understand the grays can be an exciting, worthwhile, intellectual challenge.

Is this the only rationale for studying history? An intellectual challenge for operationally oriented people like yourselves to adventure in the wonderland of the liberal arts? No. Strategic concepts, including their historical derivation, are as much a part of your professional world as submarines, tanks, or missiles. It's part of the intellectual side of your career. From now on it will become more and more important to you as a decision-maker. Strategy is the framework within which decisions must be made. Your grasp of the intellectual principles that you have been studying and your ability to translate them into logical, workable, premises will directly influence the kind of officer you are, the kind of decisions that you make.

I should add that I am extremely pleased at the way you have tackled this first trimester's work. Your professors are excited by your enthusiasm and your willingness to accept each new challenge. Visiting lecturers have been extremely complimentary of your thoughtful seminar discussions and incisive questions.

A recent visitor wrote to me "I was impressed with the quality of the reading list, with the questions that were asked of me, with the discussions in the seminars I attended as well as with the content of most of the student papers I had an opportunity to read. I came away with a very strong feeling that staff and students were making every effort to achieve real

~~academic standards~~ in the sense that I understand them."
I can only believe you've begun to enjoy the intellectual jousting which goes with all this. It certainly clears away the cobwebs and gets the gears turning. It also confirms the confidence I have had in you. Your success has given me greater hope and expectation than I have had for some time in the kind of Armed Forces that can and will evolve in this country when you rise to the positions of leadership at the top.

History also ties to the idea that we are professionals - that there is a military profession.

Huntington: An historical perspective is part of the expertise which distinguishes a profession from a craft or skill. A plumber or carpenter does not need to know how and why his craft developed. He needs only to know the latest and best skills. Professional men must be aware of the tradition of which they are a part because it influences how they make decisions. It provides us with moral/ethical guides for actions.

1. In an economic sense this means understanding to what extent the state can and will support certain alternatives.
2. In a tactical sense this means understanding the constraints placed on tactical alternatives by tradition, by the national self-image, and by our military's sense of our reputation.

There are 2 characteristics or aspects of our profession which I want to stress today.

One is our Ethics; and the other our Ability to adapt to chang

Ethics was a good topic last year with my Lai and Lavelle as fresh examples

It is even more cogent this year with added examples of the Cambodian bombing, Watergate and Agnew.

We are all, politicians, bureaucrats, military men and others paying more attention to ethical issues today. Is this attention tending to make us regard ethical issues as black and white. Are they? Are ethics absolute? Are my ethics the same as yours? Are our professional ethics the same? Should they be? Can they be? Let's glance at 2 examples:

First, the Cambodian bombing records were falsification is bad? All bad? Should we consider that the reason for this falsification was to maintain a degree of military secrecy that has been accepted as normal in past wars?

Second, General Lavelle was certainly wrong to authorize the raids that he did but, did he do this on the basis of what he considered was the more moral alternative? Under the circumstances of an alternative that might have saved American lives?

In one of the books you are reading this week, the General, there were no starkly moral, black and white issues. The General simply went from combat action to combat action failing to reassess his assumptions. He goes from failure to failure with

greater and greater losses of personnel. ~~Is~~ this man venal? Stupid? Self-serving? Indifferent to human suffering? No. Forrester doesn't portray him that way. He makes him a basically bright, attractive, sincere and well-intentioned person. If the General failed to look for the truth, so too, did thousands of others in the military, civilian leadership, the press and the public of his time. The advice the General gave was telling people what they wanted to hear rather then committing occupational suicide as a renegade. He didn't see any moral or ethical issues to be surmounted. Or if he did was he perhaps saving himself until he would be in a position to be able to affect significant change? ~~Or~~ is there danger in what may happen to the values which ~~any of us~~ we hold as we move along the way ~~to such a position~~ of responsibility? At what point do we decide something has to be said or done and to break with the system?

This raises an issue on which we all should cogitate. At what point do we make our disagreement with policy or operations known? Must we not avoid becoming committed in a small way such that we may later be unable to extract ourselves. But if we move precipitately to dissent - perhaps before all of the facts are clear - do we not run the danger of being a martyr for no cause at all?

Poignant - Halberstam

"Then Johnson had McNamara, just back from Vietnam, summarize the situation, growing Communist strength, steady government deterioration. Then Johnson took over. He had five choices. One was to blast the North off the map with bombers. Another was simply to pack up and go home. The third choice was to stay the way we were, perhaps lose more territory and suffer more casualties. The fourth was to go to the Congress for great sums of money, to call up the reserves and go on a wartime footing." The fifth choice was to expand the war without going on a wartime footing, to give the commanders what they needed. He had, he said, decided that this was the correct one, the centrist, moderate one: only Lyndon Johnson could go to war and be centrist and moderate. Then he turned to them and asked if anyone there had objections. He asked the principals one by one. The key moment was when he came to General Wheeler and stood looking directly at him for a moment. "Do you, General Wheeler, agree"? Wheeler nodded his agreement. It was, said someone who was present, an extraordinary moment, like watching a lion tamer

dealing with some of the great lions. Everyone in the room knew Wheeler objected, that the Chiefs wanted more, that they wanted a wartime footing and a call-up of the reserves; the thing they feared most was a partial war and a partial commitment. But Wheeler was boxed in; he had the choice of opposing and displeasing his Commander in Chief and being over-ruled, anyway, or going along. He went along. It was the beginning of what was to be a very difficult war for him, of being caught again and again between his civilian authorities and the other Chiefs (~~whose views~~ he shared but was always able to contain ~~himself~~). It was for him an endless series of frustrations, and only his brilliant political negotiations kept the Chiefs together and prevented several resignations at different points. He came out of it an exhausted and depleted man, his health ruined by major heart attacks, and the questions which he had faced at that July meeting still unanswered."

The break with authority or the system is especially difficult in our profession because other military organizations as employers are slim. The French Foreign Legion is no more and Russia, unlike her treatment of John Paul Jones, hasn't shown interest in our military iconoclasts recently.

It is not, though, just a matter of personal sacrifice of one's career that is involved. What are our obligations to our Service, to our comrades, to our country? Can these conflict with our personal sense of integrity? I would suggest that this issue is particularly vexing to a military man

because you and I must deal in two realms of morality -- the private and the public.

Now I don't suggest that this is entirely unique in the military. Every businessman, for instance, has his public responsibilities and morality. But I would suggest that there's a big difference between saying, "What's good for General Motors is good for the United States", and saying something like, "National security is essential to the preservation of our society."

The former is quoted almost always in derision, even though there's an element of truth in it. The latter has a great deal of truth in it. But, how many times is it quoted in support of questionable causes? That, it seems to me, is the essence of the issue of public morality for military men. That is, how often do you and I take advantage of the greater freedom that appeals to patriotism give us? After all, we work for the State. A fundamental proposition of any State is that it attempts to preserve itself, and hence the well-being of its citizens. As a result, we all commonly condone actions by our State that would contravene our private sense of morality. War itself is one example. Purposeful deceit and spying are others.

Let's be more specific. Let me go back to the case of General Lavelle. Lavelle said he believed that he was acting in the spirit of his orders by preventing a Communist troop/material buildup. Why then did he falsify records? There was reason to be devious if he thought he was carrying out orders. Yet did he not really violate his trust by ordering 28 unauthorized raids and three falsified after-action reports?

Why did he do this? Was it for personal gain or glory? It doesn't appear that way to me. And, curiously, I have never seen a newspaper man suggest that. Nor have I ever seen one who even asked the question, "Why did this man do what it is averred that he did?" The newspapermen immediately assumed that because General Lavelle contravened our sense of private morality, he was deserving of condemnation. Perhaps in General Lavelle's view, he acted because his sense of public morality justified what he did. Perhaps he felt that the nation's interests were endangered by prolonging the war, and wasting lives, because of the way in which he was forced to fight.

Can we not in some sense sympathize with a man who at least appeared to be trying to serve his nation's security? And even perhaps, because he accepted the responsibility and the risk of disavowal and dishonor in order to achieve what seemed to him to be important to the country? But, too, are not loyalty and obedience the highest military virtues? Do we not, as professionals, abhor precedents that break down the fundamental precept of subordination ~~in our military~~ way of life! And at ~~this~~ that particular moment in our country's history, wasn't General Lavelle running counter to what the citizens of this country would support as being in the interests of national security! Did he then, not hurt the image and reputation of our entire military profession, and in so doing, vitally damage our ability to defend the nation's security interests? And ironically,

did he not bring down upon us greater control of our military operations in war, the very thing that may have motivated him to break with authority?

Now let's look at the other and more recent case of military falsification - the Cambodian bombing fiasco. A good case can be made for the secrecy surrounding the over 3000 sorties made over Cambodia in 1969 and 70. But why was it necessary to lie about it? Here is what Tony Lewis who was at our Military-Media Conference last week, said about it: in his syndicated column:

"The bombing was done without announcement and without the approval of Congress. And now it emerges that even the classified military records were falsified. A former Air Force Officer testified that he and others had made detailed false reports of raids in South Vietnam - raids that were not made - and had burned the real records of attacks in Cambodia. A supposedly complete bombing record supplied to the Senate Armed Services Committee by the Pentagon only last month still omitted these Cambodia raids. General Brown, in a letter to the committee did not dispute the testimony. He just said in effect, that the lies did not matter because those who ordered and planned the raids would not have been deceived. He put it:

"I do not believe it is correct to characterize reports under special security precautions directed by higher authority as 'false' so long as the reports met in every detail the requirements imposed. They were not intended to deceive those with a security 'need-to-know'. ."

Translation of General Brown's Newspeak is easy. "Special security reporting" means lying. "Those who had a need to receive accurate information" means the chain of military command, presumably up to the President. Congress and the public had no "need to know" and hence were not entitled to the truth. Lies do not count when told to them. General Brown added that the false reports had not violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice. That requires proof of "intent to deceive," he said, and there was none here.

Is it the official policy of the Secretary of Defense that one legitimate security device shall be claculated falsifying of the military reporting system?

If so, it is quite clear that what the cadets in American military academies and the officers and men in the services are going to understand as the basis of their careers: Truth and your oath to the Constitution are outdated notions; you owe no respect to the American public or its legislative representatives; you may lie in the performance of your duties without fear of retribution or conscience, by relying on the "legal" excuse that your superiors knew you were lying.

Now I am not saying that Tony Lewis has an unbrased outlook on this. I am pointing out that we subject ourselves to unmerciful criticism and harm to our profession when we get into this kind of a position.

And how we get into some of these raises another issue you should think about. That is the case of the over zealous sergeant or lieutenant such as the ones who reported on the Cambodian and Lavelle cases. If there is a lack of accountability up and down the line, do we need a sergeant to blow the whistle? Is this a chain of command failure? How would you feel if a subordinate of yours pulled a tattle tale? After all, he's expected to know right from wrong, and as a matter of fact, has the obligation under the UCMJ of refusing to carry out illegal orders. Would you excorrate him for lack of loyalty to the organization? What if he is immature and over-zealously wrong but does you and us grievous harm in the meantime. Does this not say something about the sense of confidence in the chain of command and the system, which we must engender if we are to survive?

Now I suppose that the key question that you and I should ask ourselves in thinking of the Lavelle and Cambodian cases is, "Did the people involved think these implications through before they took the actions they did?" Would you? Would I? Do you and I each carefully consider the possible conflicts of public and private morality before we act? Are we aware of the choices that we have to make--choices that are only blurred by stirring

slogans like, "What's good for General Motors . . ." or "National Security is essential . . ."

Can we lay down rules of conduct for situations like these, or other situations in which you and I may well find ourselves when loyalty, the prospects of promotion, public acclaim, and other factors, impinge on what our private conscience would tell us is right, moral or legal.

Obviously, there is no easy answer. In my personal view there is no rigid formula. What you want to dig out of this seminar week, however, is the nature of the conflicts of conscience and purpose that are likely to confront you as military men. Only by understanding that they exist, by seeing how others have handled them before you, and by dissecting the causative elements, can you possibly prepare yourselves to encounter situations such as these.

Be sure too, that you appreciate that I am not talking of issues that are confined only to four-star officers. These conflicts of public and private morality are with each of us from the day that we accept our commission. You simply can not live in an atmosphere where the glorious purpose of the organization permits some violations of private morality without it affecting your standards.

But there are obligations that we must keep in mind if we are to be professionals. Huntington says that the professional is a practicing expert, someone who works in a social context, who performs a service. The professional's client is always society. Society cannot function without him. This means that the professional must express a sense of social responsibility. If he does not, and if the services on which he has a monopoly are indeed essential to the society, that society is endangered.

Clearly, the basic sense of social responsibility in our profession is strong today. My Lai, Lavelle, the Cambodian cover up were individual failures to meet age-old standards of our profession. I am proud that no one has talked about a "Post My Lai" morality - as some have of post-Watergate. We have the basic integrity to recognize and discredit an aberration.

Even so, there are some who believe that the unique elements of a military profession are bound to promote excesses of all sorts. They accuse us from time to time of being militaristic, rather than being military men. Alfred Vagts coined the word militarism, and he defined it in the following terms:

> "An Army so built that it serves military men, not war, is militaristic. So is everything in an army which is not preparation for fighting but merely exists for diversion or to satisfy peacetime whims, like the long anachronistic cavalry. This was well expressed by the Russian Grand Duke, who admitted that he hated war 'bacause it spoils the armies. . .'"

Of course none of us here would think of becoming militaristic in Vagts' sense of the word. Surely none of us would go overboard for ceremonies or covet decorations, or be rigid in protocol or abuse the privileges of rank. None of us would be so anachronistic as to advocate cavalry or battleships long after their useful life had passed by. Certainly no one here would suggest that carriers or main battle tanks, or Continental Air Defense, or B-1's, or any of the many other projects that various of us have espoused in recent years, will ever appear to have been calalry cases.

Vagts wrote of militarism in 1937. He updated the book in 1959, but isn't this concept really out of date in the enlightened military environment in which you and I live? Isn't militarism an anachronism in itself? Well, I would suggest that in the very year that Vagts updated the book, the Army of France was exhibiting many of the characteristics of his definition. And I would suggest that today people still comment frequently on the "Military Mind" and the "Military Mentality." They accuse us of things like being innately conservative, failing to see when our place in the society has changed, being political whether we admit it or not, and suppressing innovations in tactics and even in technology, when it contravenes our accustomed way of doing things.

Or have we simply been the victim of type-casting? There are many ways, of course, in which we are type-cast. We--you and

I, should look at these roles, I believe, and try to see whether we think they are true, and if so, why? For instance, does our frequent necessity for subordinating individualism to obedience inevitably separate us from the liberal thinkers of the world? Or is it because our concern as a profession is with the use of military power and a liberal's concern is more with economics, that we appear to be separated? Or is that separation necessary and inevitable?

If we are isolated from our society, is it because of peculair requirements of our profession or our own indifference? Will ~~the society~~ help or aggravate this isolation as we move into an all-volunteer force? For instance if we do overstress the threat to national security, is it out of selfish purposes, or from a genuine concern that our politicians may not understand the proper exercise and limits of military force, and might get us into situations over our head.

Perhaps the type-casting that really bothers me most is the belief that we stubbonly resist change. One theory is that we are a small society unto ourselves; that any society has an instinct for self-preservation; and that preservation to most people means, "Don't change anything. Keep the status quo."

There are some choice stories in Elting Morison's delightful little book that unfortunately seem to bear out this thesis.

One of these involved one of my predecessors here as President of the War College, Admiral William S. Sims, and incidentally he happened to be the father-in-law of the author of the book, Professor Morison. At the turn of the century Captain Sims uncovered a way to make absolutely radical ~~and marked~~ improvements in naval gunnery. The Naval Society offered only unremitting resistance. Why? Because the people were either too stupid or too proud to see the improvements? No, not really. Because the people who resisted Sims identified the Navy with a particular type of equipment or a particular set of procedures that were part of their own personal experience. To them, an attack on these particularities was, in effect, an attack on the whole Navy itself.

Can you imagine someone walking in the door this morning and standing up here and telling all of us that all ships are now outmoded, that there now are better ways to do the Navy's job? How do you think our little society would receive him? With openmindedness and joy?

Well Admiral Sims fortunately did succeed as ~~you know~~. And as you've read, he appealed to outside authority--to the President himself. This led Admiral Mahan later to state that no Military Service could or should undertake to reform itself. It simply had to be done from the outside.

Do you believe that? Do you want to admit that we can not shape our own destiny from within the military service?

And if we cannot, how in the world do we go about getting the help from the outside? In the business world, you can simply invite somebody in from the outside--even at the top! We've seldom brought in Admirals and Generals from the civilian world in our tight little society. But if Morison and Mahan are right, would you support selecting perhaps 30% of the Flag and General Officers each year from the civilian ~~side of the~~ world? Can you do that in what we call a profession? There are interesting concepts and conflicts here.

And look carefully in your reading this week at the other marvelous example of resistance to change. Morison's story of the USS WAMPANOAG, a ship which, incidentally, was named for an Indian tribe right from here in Southern New England. She was commissioned in 1868. She was steam propelled and could travel, at twenty knots. That was five knots faster than any other vessel afloat at that time. That is 33% speed advantage. She could run circles around anybody. Today we're paying millions of dollars for far lesser speed advantages. We didn't build another ship like WAMPANOAG for twenty years; ~~and~~ just one year after we commissioned her, we laid her up and eventually sold her.

Why did we do ~~that~~? Well, Professor Morison suggest that it was because the Navy had no concept of why we needed such a ship. The Navy had no mission for a ship with her capabilities.

The reasons given at the time for eliminating her were ~~in fact~~, specious. But perhaps the Naval Society was in fact, reacting with logic. For after all, if they didn't have the foresight to see where the WAMPANOAG fitted in, they were wasting resources to procure her.

Here now we see the transition that is coming between your Strategy Curriculum and your forthcoming Defense Economics Course. The Navy rejected WAMPANOAG because it did not have a clearly defined mission for the ship. Not until Mahan did the Navy gain an understanding of its objective, and go on to build ships of that type.

We will work in your Defense Economics Curriculum to address the necessity for defining the purpose, the objectives of military forces--particularly of course, of Naval forces--before we can decide whether we should be building WAMPANOAGS, carriers, submarines, or what-have-you? For these past ten seminar weeks you've been dealing in the broad, ethereal realms of strategy. We're now beginning the deflation process to the everyday world of decision making. You will make better decisions if you can place them in a strategic framework. You will also make better decisions if you appreciate the moral conflicts that you may face, the societal pressures of the military environment, and the dubious patterns that many of your predecessors have traced. All of these considerations form the background to your study in Defense Economics.

'No Intent to Deceive'

AT HOME ABROAD

By Anthony Lewis

LONDON, July 22—When is a lie not a lie? When it deceives only 99.9 per cent of those who hear it.

That is the moral doctrine of Gen. George S. Brown, the new Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force. He propounded it the other day in commenting on the disclosure that Air Force officers had systematically falsified reports in order to conceal the secret American bombing of Cambodia.

By all indications General Brown was serious. He probably reflects the legal and moral attitudes of a number of military leaders. It would therefore be a mistake to let his statement pass without close attention.

Between March, 1969, and April, 1970, the Air Force made 3,630 bombing sorties on Cambodia, a country whose neutrality the United States officially respected. The bombing was done without announcement and without the approval of Congress. And now it emerged that even the classified military records were falsified.

A former Air Force officer testified that he and others had made detailed false reports of raids in South Vietnam—raids that were not made—and had burned the real records of attacks in Cambodia. A supposedly complete bombing record supplied to the Senate Armed Services Committee by the Pentagon only last month still omitted these Cambodia raids.

General Brown, in a letter to the committee, did not dispute the testimony. He just said, in effect, that the lies did not matter because those who ordered and planned the raids would not have been deceived. He put it:

"I do not believe it is correct to characterize reports under special security precautions directed by higher authority as 'false' so long as the reports met in every detail the requirements imposed. They were not intended to deceive those with a security 'need-to-know.'

"I feel sure that the special security reporting conducted at unit level was designed to provide for maximum security, not to mislead those who had a need to receive accurate information."

Translation of General Brown's Newspeak is easy. "Special security reporting" means lying. "Those who had a need to receive accurate information" were the military command, presumably up to the President. Congress and the public had no "need to know" and hence were not entitled to the truth. Lies do not count when told to them.

General Brown added that the false reports had not violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice. That requires proof of "intent to deceive," he said, and there was none here.

These theories got no support from Melvin R. Laird, the former Secretary of Defense now in the White House, or Henry Kissinger, who termed the falsification of records "deplorable." But the present Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, described the practice in officialese as a species of "special security precautions." And his spokesman defended it as mere double-entry bookkeeping.

Is General Brown's moral and constitutional doctrine what they teach at the Air Force Academy? Is it the official policy of the Secretary of Defense that one legitimate security device shall be calculated falsifying of the military reporting system?

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If so, it is quite clear what the cadets in American military academies and the officers and men in the services are going to understand as the basis of their careers: Truth and your oath to the Constitution are outdated notions; you owe no respect to the American public or its legislative representatives; you may lie in the performance of your duties without fear of retribution or conscience, by relying on the "legal" excuse that your superiors knew you were lying.

What is so sad is that the Pentagon reaction to the Cambodian bombing disclosures was all so unnecessary. Just a little candor and sense of proportion would have enabled a Chief of Staff or a Secretary of Defense to say something like this:

"The testimony about falsifying of bombing records is correct. These measures were undertaken in 1969-70 in good faith, in connection with highly sensitive military missions. But it is recognized now that falsification of the military records system is not an appropriate security measure. The department also regrets the supplying of inaccurate information to Congress."

Why is it that we do not get such simple — and effective — admissions of error? Doubtless the most important reason is that we look to the President of the United States for [illegible] President now who sets an example of defensiveness, obsession with secrecy and indifference to law.